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Transportation: - Select Mode -AviationHighwayHazmatMarineRailroadPipeline
Please describe your request or comment below - be specific about
dates, locations, etc., where applicable:
The Federal Government is to Cease and Disist from investigationof the
San Bruno fire/explosion, current records (attach in commentbelow) are
pending in Admin 3 Admiralty and Marintime;
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594
Preliminary Report
Accident No.: DCA10MP008
Type of System: 30-inch natural gas transmission pipeline
Accident Type: Pipeline rupture
Location: San Bruno, CA
Date: September 9, 2010
Time: About 6:11 p.m., Pacific Daylight Time
Owner/Operator: Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Fatalities/Injuries: Eight fatalities, multiple injuries
Pipeline Pressure: 386 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) at the time
of rupture
Quantity Released: Approximately 47.6 million standard cubic feet (MMSCF)
On September 9, 2010, at approximately 6:11 p.m. Pacific Daylight
Time(1), a 30-inch diameter natural gas transmission pipeline (Line
132) owned and operated by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E)
ruptured in a residential area in San Bruno, California. On September
10, the NTSB launched a team to Californiato investigate this tragedy.
Vice Chairman Christopher Hart was theNTSB Board Member on scene in
San Bruno.
The rupture on Line 132 occurred near mile post (MP) 39.33, at the
intersection of Earl Avenue and Glenview Drive in the city of San
Bruno. Approximately 47.6 million standard cubic feet (MMSCF) of
natural gas was released as a result of the rupture. The rupture
created a crater approximately 72 feet long by 26 feet wide. A pipe
segment approximately 28 feet long was found about 100 feet away from
the crater. The released natural gas was ignited sometime after the
rupture; the resulting firedestroyed 37 homes and damaged 18. Eight
people were killed, numerous individuals were injured, and many more
were evacuated from the area.
The Incident Command was set up by the local fire department. The
immediate response by local emergency responders, as well as three
strategic drops of fire retardant and water by air, assisted in
stopping the spread of the fire.
According to PG&E records, Line 132, which is regulated by the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), was constructed using
30-inch diameter steel pipe (API 5L Grade X42) with 0.375-inch thick
wall. The pipeline was coated with hot applied asphalt, and was
cathodically protected. The ruptured pipeline segment was installed
circa 1956. The specifiedmaximum operating pressure (MOP)for the
ruptured pipeline was 375 pounds per square inch gauge (psig).
According to PG&E, the maximum allowable operating pressure for the
line was 400 psig.
Just before the accident, PG&E was working on their uninterruptable
power supply (UPS) system at Milpitas Terminal, which is located about
39.33 miles southeast of the accident site. During the course of this
work, thepower supply from the UPS system to the supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) system malfunctioned so that instead of
supplying a predetermined output of 24 volts of direct current (VDC),
the UPS system supplied approximately 7 VDC or less to theSCADA
system. Because of this anomaly, the electronic signal to the
regulating valve for Line 132 was lost. The loss of the electrical
signal resulted in the regulating valve moving from partially open to
the full open position as designed. The pressure then increased to 386
psig. The over-protection valve, which was pneumatically activated and
did not require electronic input, maintained the pressure at 386 psig.
At about 5:45 p.m., the SCADA system indicated that the pressure at
Martin Station, which is downstream of the rupture location, exceeded
375 psig. The SCADA system indicated that the pressure at Martin
Station continued to increase until it reached about 390 psig at about
6:00 p.m. At 6:08 p.m., it droppedto 386 psig. At 6:11 p.m., the
pressure at Martin Station decreased from 386 to 361.4 psig; within
one minute the pressure dropped to 289.9 psig.
PG&E dispatched a crew at 6:45 p.m. to isolate the ruptured pipe
section by closing the nearest mainline valves. The upstream valve(MP
38.49) was closed at about 7:20 p.m. and the downstream valve at Healy
Station (MP 40.05) was closed at about 7:40 p.m. Once the ruptured
section was isolated and the gas flow was stopped, the resulting fire
from theruptured line self-extinguished. Later that evening, PG&E
isolated the natural gas distribution systemserving residences in the
area, and within a minute of stopping the gasflow at about 11:30 p.m.,
fires from escaping natural gas at damaged houses went out.
When the NTSB arrived on scene onSeptember 10, the investigation began
with a visual examination of the pipe and the surrounding area. The
investigators measured, photographed, and secured the approximately
28-foot-long ruptured pipe segment. On Monday,September 13, the
ruptured pipe segment and two shorter segmentsof pipe, cut from the
north and south sides of the rupture, were crated for transport to an
NTSB facility in Ashburn, Va., for examination.
The examination revealed that the ruptured segment was 27 feet 8
inches long at its longest length, and consisted of a pipe section
andfour smaller pipe pieces (pups) between 3 feet 8.5 inches and 3
feet 11 inches long (pups are numbered one through four from south to
north).
The segment north of the rupture (north segment) was 15 feet 9 inches
long and consisted of a pipesection and two pups, 3 feet 7 inches and
4 feet 7 inches long (numbered five and six from south to north).
The section south of the rupture (south segment) was 12 feet 4.5
inches long at its longest length; itcontained no pups.
All pipe pieces and pups showed fairly uniform wall thickness of 0.36
to 0.38 inches.
There were longitudinal fractures inthe first and second pup of the
ruptured segment and a partial circumferential fracture at the girth
weld between the first and second pup. There was a complete
circumferential fracture at the girth weld between the fourth pup in
the ruptured segment and the fifth pup in the north segment.
Thelongitudinal fracture in the first pup continued south into the
pipe ending in a circumferential fracturein the middle of the pipe.
The following laboratory work on the pipe has been completed:
Written documentation, photo documentation and visual inspection of the pipe.
Removal of the asphalt coating from outside of the three pipe segments
in preparation for non-destructive examination work.
Radiography of the girth welds and select seams.
Microbiological testing of the pipe surface (samples currently being analyzed).
Ultrasonic wall thickness measurements.
Magnetic particle inspection of welds and seams.
3-D laser scanning of the pipe pieces for a digital dimensional record
of the evidence.
Measurement of the longitudinal and circumferential pup dimensions.
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